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I. Regimes and Questions
Figure 1 plots the 3‐month commercial paper rate and Atkeson and
Kehoe’s long bond yield.
1 Pretty clearly, the big regime shift starts in
1933, when the United States, following the United Kingdom in 1932,
abandonedthegoldstandard.Youcanseeothershiftsaswell.Thefound-
ingoftheFedandthepartialretreatfromthegoldstandardin1914ledto
the visible decrease in high‐frequency short‐rate movements and an in-
crease in long‐rate volatility. The Fed‐Treasury accord and Paul Volker’s
policy shift occasioned well‐known breaks. Atkeson and Kehoe ask if
there is another regime shift in 1990, so I also marked that date. But the
biggest single change is, obviously, the shift from the gold standard (or
what was left of it) to an interest rate–targeting regime in 1933.
Atkeson and Kehoe's paper asks: “What change in policy and in-
stitutions led to these changes in regimes”? The answer seems rather
obvious—and it is a bit strange that the paper does not mention the gold
standard until the concluding comments and that in a dismissive way.
Why did abandoning the gold standard have such a dramatic effect?
Figure 2 dramatizes what we all know: the price level was steady under
the gold standard and has been replaced by continual and variable in-
flation ever since.
The “need for new models” that the paper argues for in this context is
merely that we do not have a model of the Fed that explains why the Fed
chooses one regime or another or why the Fed allowed inflation to in-
crease in the 1970s and then chose to disinflate in the 1980s. I think this
part of the call for new theory will fall flat for most economists, who are
content to think of the Fed as making mistakes here and there and
learning from experience. To most of us, it would be an equally empty
call that we need “new economic theory” to explain why people did not
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Fig. 2. Price level. Source: Tom Sargent's Web siteuse the Internet in 1930. The Internet, like the Taylor rule, simply had
not been invented yet. The much more interesting “call for new mod-
els” involves risk premia, which I discuss below.
The paper goes on to what I feel are more interesting “regime”questions:
1. Is there any evidence for a regime change around 1980? Can we see
in interest rates a difference between an “uncontrolled inflation” regime
and a “disinflation” regime? (Or “indeterminate” vs. “determinate” in
New Keynesian language.) Atkeson and Kehoe do not ask about 1980,
but everyone else does, so it makes sense for us to ask this question.
2. Can we see the emergence of an “anchored long‐term expectations”
regime around 1990?
3. If so, are interest rates returning to the sort of behavior we saw be-
fore 1933?
II. The Standard Approach
Thestandardreadingofinterestratehistoryisprettystraightforward.An
interest rate target stabilizes the very‐short‐run behavior of short‐term
rates. The short rate follows a well‐known history involving policy,
inflation, and recessions. Long rates simply follow as expectations
of future short rates. Since the Fed cannot move short rates forever,
long rates are revealing measures of inflation expectations. A long‐
term price level commitment, or a sufficiently inflation‐phobic Fed,
then leads to stable long rates. This view seems to provide a pretty
good description of the gold standard transition, as seen in figure 1.
For a closer look at the postwar data, figures 3 and 4 present the Federal
Reserve’s constant‐maturity yield series.
Now “anchored expectations” really is the central question of the
moment. Was Greenspan skilled or lucky? Has the Fed learned a lesson
and changed its behavior in fundamental ways—and did people come
to believe this around 1990? Or did the Fed simply face a lucky set of
shocks, so that, if faced with the shocks of the 1970s, it would take us
down the same path? For example, does the Fed distinguish “supply”
from “demand” shocks, and has it learned not to respond to the for-
mer? Or is it following a mechanical response to output and inflation,
and are we just a few adverse “supply shocks” away from 1979 infla-
tion? Does it assess the state of inflation expectations—how far out the
Phillips curve is—when deciding on policy? Is there an “inflation tar-
get,” a solid commitment to bring inflation back to 1%–2%, quickly?
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Fig. 4. Spread of Federal Reserve constant‐maturity yields over the 1‐year yieldOK, one more chocolate donut to get us through the morning, but will
we really start that diet tomorrow? Reading Fed statements does not
give much hope on these questions, but perhaps the data do—and
especially long‐term inflation expectations read through long‐term in-
terest rates.
Alas, I see very little evidence for regime shifts in these plots. A regime
shift is a change in the stochastic process, not just a peculiar draw of
shocks. The short interval of high volatility during the non–borrowed re-
serve targeting era might qualify. There is a shift from upward to down-
ward trend in 1980, but if one simply superimposes slowly increasing
expected inflation before 1980 and slowly decreasing expected inflation
afterward, the remaining series seems largely unaffected. This is clear in
the spreads graph, figure 4. Perhaps the last two troughs are a bit longer
and deeper than those of the 1970s, but it is not clear what that means.
The best case for “anchored expectations” that I can see is that long‐
term yields did not fall into the last trough quite as much as they did in
earlier troughs and are therefore somewhat “smoother.” Looking at
prewar data makes us realize how small any such change is. The fa-
mous “conundrum” was the claim that, in the last flattening of the yield
curve in 2005, it was flatter than usual, or even inverted, and surpris-
ingly so, perhaps signaling lower inflation. That feature does not even
show up in these graphs. The last inversion was exactly the same size as
the previous two, and it is smaller than what we saw at the peaks of the
1970s and 1980s. Now it looks like a prescient expectation of the 2007–8
rate cuts. (A larger puzzle is why a Fed chairman would ever say a flat-
tening yield curve is a “conundrum” rather than a “sign of anchored
inflation expectations, removing a risk premium from every voter’s
mortgage, and you’re welcome.”)
The paper presents no tests or other evidence that the time series be-
havior of yields is different before and after either 1980 or 1990. It
would be easy enough to complement graph‐staring with quantitative
analysis, but I think that we can see that the project is rather hopeless,
or that any statistics that find such a change would involve a good deal
of filtering skulduggery to focus attention on particular frequencies.
Arewereturningtosomethinglikethepre‐1932regime?Certainlynot.
A long‐run stable price level is a very different regime from a long‐run
stable inflation rate. In the latter, inflation shocks are passed through; in
the former, a shock to inflation requires a subsequent period of deflation.
The difference is crucial for the real risk of a nominal 30‐year bond. De-
spite its potential salutary effects on long‐term bond yields, there is not a
peep out of the Fed of interest in the latter project.
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gimewithahighlyvolatileshortrate.Exactlytheoppositehashappened:
the Fed has finally removed most of the high frequency fluctuations in
the overnight federal funds rate, as we can see in figures 5 and 6. (The
big reduction in figure 6 comes from the change in reserve accounting
in 1999.) Other central banks have eliminated these spikes by converting
fully to interest rate–target operating procedures.
III. Risk Premiums
Regime‐spotting is fun, but it is a distraction. The central, important,
novel, and interesting contribution of this paper is to investigate how
risk premiums in the term structure change our picture of monetary pol-
icy and the economy. The big points I see in the paper are the following:
• We do need large and time‐varying risk premiums to understand in-
terest rate data.
• The nature of risk premiums can potentially tell us a lot about the
regime question.
Fig. 5. Daily federal funds rate (pretarget data)
Cochrane 432• Our view of monetary policy must change in important ways to ac-
commodate risk premiums.
• Example: Does policy affect risk premiums or do risk premiums affect
policy? Do we understand the correlation as premium responses to
monetary policy shocks, or vice versa?
I think the most useful thing I can do as a discussant is to tell you
(briefly) what I know about bond risk premiums and how they bear
on the regime and policy issues.
A. Unconditional Risk Premiums
You can see an intriguing pattern in unconditional risk premiums from
figure 1:
• On the gold standard, long rates were, on average below short rates.
Afterward, long rates have been, on average, above short rates.
We often treat the average “upward‐sloping yield curve” as a con-
stant of nature. It is not. It is not written in stone that banks will try
Fig. 6. Daily federal funds rate and target
Comment 433to borrow short and lend long. It is really not written in stone that banks,
investment banks,and specialpurpose vehicles will try to finance dodgy
mortgagesbyrollingovermonthly,andsometimesevenovernight,debt!
A pre‐1932 hedge fund would sell long‐term debt and buy commercial
paper.
The change in the average slope of the yield curve makes abundant
economic sense:
• If inflation is steady and real rates vary, then long‐run nominal debt is
safer for long‐run investors. If inflation varies and real rates are steady,
then rolling over short‐term nominal debt is less risky for long‐run
investors.
We expect af a l l i n gy i e l dc u r v eu n d e rag o l ds t a n d a r do ra n c h o r e d ‐
inflation regime; we expect a risk premium for short‐term bonds. We of-
tenrefertoshort‐term(moneymarket,overnight,or3‐month)ratesasthe
“risk‐free”rate.Thisisalsonotaconstantofnature,writteninstone—itis
a result of an all‐too‐familiar regime with abundant inflation variation.
(Short‐term instruments may always be the most “liquid,” but that is a
separate issue.)
Contrariwise, then, if we see a move to flatter or downward‐sloping
yield curves, this is evidence for a move to a regime with less long‐run
inflation risk.
• The average slope of the yield curve can inform us about a change in
regime.
Do movements in the yield curve suggest an “anchored expecta-
tions” regime? I see no such evidence in figures 3 and 4. If anything,
the average yield curve is more upward sloping, since the dips have
lasted longer and the long rates stayed flatter through them, and the
periods of inversion have been smaller and shorter.
The risk premium can potentially distinguish “anchored expecta-
tions” from a stable price level. A commitment to a stable price level
should have a much larger effect on the risk premium. For example,
if the expected inflation rate is constant, πt ¼ Eπ þ εt, then the real value
of a 30‐year bond has variance 30σ2
ε. If the expected price level is con-
stant, pt ¼ Ep þ εt, then the real value of a 30‐year bond has variance
σ2
ε. Conversely, this calculation shows the potentially important advan-
tages of a price‐level, rather than inflation‐rate, commitment. TIPS—
Treasury Inflation‐Protected Securities—exist (though economists may
hold100%ofthem),butmostdebtisstillnominal.Aprice‐levelcommitment
Cochrane 434can remove an unwantedrisk premium from,forexample,30‐year mort-
gage rates.
Of course, the risk premium depends not just on the variance but also
on the covariance—the risks (inflation if long, real‐rate if short) of long‐
term investing must covary with marginal utility in order to generate a
premium, and to fully connect monetary regimes and risk premiums
we need to understand why people care about inflation risk. In a neu-
tral model with varying inflation, yield curves still slope down. In a
previous Macroeconomics Annual paper on this subject, Piazzesi and
Schneider (2007) construct a model in which inflation risk is real and
does deliver a positively sloped yield curve. Measuring risk premiums
and testing whether they have declined is also the sort of question one
can and should address quantitatively, rather than just by staring at
graphs, but this has not been done yet.
B. Conditional Risk Premiums
Risk premiums are not constant:
• Expected bond returns vary through time. Expected returns are high
in recessions.
The evidence for time‐varying risk premiums comes from regres-
sions. For example, Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008, table 1) regress the
excess returns from holding long‐term bonds, less the 1‐year rate, on
five forward rates,
rxtþ1 ¼ a þ β1y
ð1Þ
t þ β2 f
ð2Þ
t þ ... þ β5 f
ð5Þ
t þ εtþ1;
obtaining R2 values as high as 0.44. The expectations hypothesis—long
yield is average of expected future short yields—is the same thing as the
statement that expected returns on different maturities are the same, so
by finding that returns are forecastable, we also find that current long
rates do not correspond to expected future spot rates.
In the context of figures 3 and 4, look at any of the episodes in which
the 1‐year rate falls for an extended period of time. During this entire
period, the long rates are “forecasting” a rise in short rates. Early in the
periods, that forecast is wrong—short rates keep going down, and long‐
termbond holdersmake money.Lateinthe periods,theforecast isright—
short rates dorise.The regressionshows a factyou can see inthe graphs if
youlookhard:givenatypicalperiodofupward‐slopingyieldcurve,short
rates almost never come up faster than long rates predict. The regressions
Comment 435say that you can reliably make money in the initial periods of low short
rates and high long rates. This finding is no surprise: it is a recession; no-
bodywantstoholdrisk.Thesamepatternextendstostocks(variablesthat
forecast bond returns also forecast stock returns) and foreign exchange
(lowinterestratesrelativetoforeignratesforecastgoodreturnsforholding
exchange rate risk). We seem to see a single, large, business cycle–related
variation in risk premium.
We are entering one of these episodes as I write in the spring of 2008.
The Fed is practically begging banks to borrow at low short rates and
hold longer‐term debt. They are so far proving remarkably unwilling to
do so, certainly compared to their behavior a year ago. This is the smell
of “increasing risk aversion” to holding all sorts of risky assets.
Now the big question:
• Are time‐varying risk premiums important to understanding mone-
tary big pictures, or are they just some little short‐term finance phenom-
enon that tacks an epicycle on the same big picture (as, e.g., liquidity
premiums seem to be)?
There is evidence that the expectations hypothesis works better in the
longrun.Forexample,Fama‐Bliss(1987)regressionsshowthat,although
the 2‐year forward rate does nothing to predict interest rate changes, the
5‐year forward rate forecasts 5‐year interest rate changes exactly as the
expectations hypothesis predicts. I think risk premiums have been ig-
noredinmacroeconomicdiscussionsonthisgeneralfeelingthattheover-
allleveloflong‐termyieldsandtheconnectiontomonetarypolicycanbe
well enough understood via the expectations hypothesis.
This is not true, and that is one major point of this paper. Let me show
youanotherwaytomakethispoint.CochraneandPiazzesi(2008)extend
risk premium regressions to produce a yield curve decomposition—to
calculateatanydatehowmuchofalong‐termbondyieldorforwardrate
corresponds to expected future spot rates and how much corresponds to
a risk premium. (These calculations are a somewhat more sophisticated
version of Atkeson and Kehoe’s yield curve decomposition. The main
difference is that Atkeson and Kehoe model expected returns as an AR(1).
We findthat slopeand curvature movementsforecastfuture expectedre-
turns as well as past expected returns, so we forecast expected returns
withaVARinvolvingalltermstructurefactors.Wealsoimposethestruc-
ture of an arbitrage‐free model.)
Figures 7 and 8 present two of our preliminary results. In the expec-
tations hypothesis view, the 5‐year and 10‐year forward rates are equal
Cochrane 436to the expected 10‐year rate 4 and 9 years in the future. Expected y
(1) pre-
sents our estimate of the actual expected future 1‐year interest rates. The
vertical distance between these expected interest rates and the forward
rates represents the forward premium. (Yields paint a similar picture.)
You can see that risk premiums are not a small affair:
• Including time‐varying risk premiums gives a dramatically different
view of interest rates.
For example, consider the two dips in the early 1990s and 2000s. In
the conventional view, the short rate drops, but it is expected to return
within 5 years (fig. 7) or at least 10 years (fig. 8), as the 5‐year and
10‐year forward rates barely budge during the episodes. In fact, taking
account of risk premiums, we see that the 5‐year and 10‐year expected
interest rates fall just as fast as the 1‐year rate. In the early parts of re-
cessions, the spread between forward and current spot rate is entirely
due to risk premium and not at all due to expected changes in interest
rates. After a while, though, the recession ends, and it becomes clear
Fig. 7. Current 1‐year rate y
1 ðÞ
t ,5 ‐year forward rate f
5 ðÞ
t , and expected 1‐year rate Ety
1 ðÞ
tþ4
computed from esitmated affine model in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008).
Comment 437that short rates will rise quickly. Risk premiums fall, and the forward
rate now reflects expected future interest rates.
Are these volatile interest rate forecasts reasonable? In the early
2000s, economists, the Fed, and commentators were writing about de-
flation, helicopter drops, liquidity effects, zero bounds on nominal
rates, and avoiding the Japanese experience.
2 An expectation that the
low interest rate environment might last quite a while, rather than be
quickly reversed, seems at least plausible. As I write this, we are enter-
ing another one of these episodes. What is the chance that interest rates
will quickly rise, so that banks who took the Fed’s offer to borrow short
and lend long will end up losing money? If you think that this is un-
likely, then you think there is a risk premium and that expected future
interest rates are below long rates.
In sum, we see a major difference in the interpretation of long‐term
yield data.
• Expected future interest rates follow current rates more closely than
they follow forward rates (or long yields).
Fig. 8. Current 1‐year rate y
1 ðÞ
t ; 10‐year forward rate f
10 ðÞ
t ; and expected 1‐year rate Ety
1 ðÞ
tþ9;
computed from estimated affine model in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008).
Cochrane 438Just by staring at the graph, however, I have to disagree with Atkeson
and Kehoe’s main conclusion.
• Expected future interest rates, measured including risk premiums, still
vary a great deal, arguing against a shift to “anchored expectations.”
Taking account of risk premium makes the case for anchored expecta-
tions much worse. Perhaps if we treat the forward rates lines of figures 7
and 8 as direct expectation measures, we might think that long‐horizon
expectedinterestratesarebecomingmorestableovertime.Buttheactual
expected interest rates are much more volatile,even at a 10‐yearhorizon.
(Onceagain,thisisthesortofquestionthatisamenabletostatisticalanal-
ysis and not just to staring at graphs.)
The fall in the 10‐year forward rate in 2005, which you can see in fig-
ure 8, was really the centerpiece of the “conundrum” discussion. The
central question was whether this movement was a fall in expected in-
flation or a risk premium and what that meant for monetary policy.
3
Yes, the graph can be read that much of the fall corresponded to a de-
cline in risk premium—or a failure of the short rate to rise as fast as it
had in past events. However, there was nothing “unprecedented” about
it—risk premiums are always low in booms, as they were in 1989 and
1996. Therefore, I do not see any regime shift toward anchored expecta-
tions even in this widely reported event. (Also, ocular standard errors
suggest there is not much point to worrying about the last 50 basis
points of such decompositions anyway.)
Is there evidence that this conditional risk premium has changed
over time? It is hard enough to estimate forecasting regressions; esti-
mating changes in such regressions is obviously tough.
• The evidence we have is that, if anything, time‐varying risk premiums
are increasing.
You can see this in the larger and longer‐lasting swings in spreads
seen in figure 4 and the larger premiums (difference between forward
rate and expected inflation) in figures 7 and 8. Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005) present a table (table 8a) of subsample results, which I partially
reproduce here as table 1. The 1990s are the R2 champion.
It would be really nice to know if this aspect of the term structure is
the same before and after the gold standard. A glance at figure 1 sug-
gests that there are time‐varying risk premiums in early bond data as
well, as there are persistent movements in the spread between short
and long rates. Again, regressions need to be run.
Comment 439C. Monetary Policy
Atkeson and Kehoe’s main point, really, is that graphs such as those in
our own figures 7 and 8 force us to rethink monetary policy. The view
“policy chooses the short rate, and long rates follow by expectations
hypothesis” is clearly untenable.
The obvious question is, in a period such as the current one, ”Is the
sharp decline in interest rates a monetary policy shock,o raction, which
causes risk premiums to rise? If so, how in the world does monetary pol-
icy cause a risk premium to rise so much? Or is it a response, part of the
“systematic” or “rule” part of policy? Or is there some feedback?” Atke-
son andKehoeadvocateafascinating view:itisaresponse.Intheir view,
recessions come for reasons unrelated to the Fed and risk premiums rise.
If the Fed did not lower interest rates, long rates would have to rise dra-
matically.
4TheFedstabilizeslongrates(andlotsofotherthings!)bylow-
ering short rates in response to the increased risk premium or to the
macroeconomic conditions that set it off.




Subsample Analysis of Bond‐Return Forecasting Regressions
All f γ⊤f Only
R2 γ⊤fR 2
1964:01–2003:12 .35 1.00 .35
1964:01–1979:08 .31 .73 .26
1979:08–1982:10 .78 .77 .24
1982:10–2003:12 .23 .85 .22
1964:01–1969:12 .31 .73 .26
1970:01–1979:12 .22 .65 .16
1980:01–1989:12 .43 1.09 .35
1990:01–1999:12 .71 1.57 .43
2000:01–2003:12 .65 .60 .34
Source: Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005, table 8a).
Note: The first column presents the R2 of the regression
rxtþ1 ¼ γ⊤ft þ εtþ1:
The second set of columns report the coefficient estimate b and R2 from
rxtþ1 ¼ b γ⊤ft

þ εtþ1
using the γ parameter from the full sample regression. Sample: 1964–2003.
Cochrane 440I would point out that real theories have just as much trouble generating
such a large time‐varying risk premium.
Since none of us is writing models or running regressions, though, let
me sketch an alternative possibility. Surely, no risk premium comes out
of money supply and demand and how often you and I go to the ATM
machine. But you and I do not get to borrow at the overnight federal
funds rate, nor can we even short 1‐year treasury bills. The main effect
of drastically lowering short‐term rates in the quite restricted overnight
marketispreciselytogiveagreaterpremiumtotherestrictedsetofinter-
mediarieswhocanborrowovernightandlendtoyouandme.Generating
a “risk premium” seems entirely the point of current monetary policy.
And this is the sort of issue one can at least begin to analyze by run-
ning policy rule regressions. Let me show you two known facts that
bear on the issue, however.
1. Risk Premiums and GDP Growth
The observation that the term structure slope forecasts GDP growth,
starting with Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), has evolved much as risk
premium forecasting has evolved past slope measures such as that of
Fama and Bliss (1987). Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2006, table 8) find that
ytþ4   yt ¼ a þ 1:15ð5:00ÞEHt   0:47ð0:30ÞRPt þ εtþ4;
where t‐statistics are in parentheses. Here, EH ¼ expectations hypoth-
esis and RP = risk premium in the 20‐quarter term spread. Similarly,
Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson (2007, table 2) report
ytþ4   yt ¼ 0:38ð4:22Þþ0:96ð5:62Þðexspt   exspt 4Þ
  0:59ð 1:93Þðtpt   tpt 4Þþεtþ4;
where t‐statistics are in parentheses. Here, y ¼ GDP; exsp is the ex-
pectations hypothesis component of the 10‐year rate, and tp is the term
premium component of the 10‐year rate.
The lesson I learn from these regressions is that the second coefficient
is zero. (Cochrane [2007] discusses this issue in a bit more detail.)
• Expected interest rates, largely driven by the slope of the yield curve,
forecast GDP growth; risk premiums do not. The risk premium, largely
driven by curvature of the forward curve, forecasts bond returns; the
expectations component does not.
As in figures 7 and 8, risk premiums are high early in a recession, pre-
cisely when we are not sure how long it will last.
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One last piece of evidence that bears on these issues is this:
• Interest rate risk premiums are earned entirely in compensation for
the risk of “level” shocks. In particular, they do not correspond to co-
variances with slope, curvature, or expected‐returns shocks.
Expected returns are earned as compensation for risk—as compensa-
tion for the fact that returns are low in specific high marginal utility
states of the world. The question is: What is the nature of shocks that







tþ1; vtþ1Þ λt: ð1Þ
(I write ≈ because we use logs for bond data, which introduces a small
1=2σ2 term. One return n earns a higher premium than another because
it has a larger covariance with a shock vtþ1. The λ or “market price of
risk” is the same for all n.) In Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008), we find that
bond risk premiums are entirely driven by covariance with level shocks
and not at all by the other shocks to the yield curve, including slope,
expected return, and curvature.
This kind of finance work paves the way to macroeconomic under-
standing. Macroeconomic events that show up as shocks to the level of
interest rates generate risk premiums. Macroeconomic events that show
up as shocks to the slope or other dimensions of the term structure do
not. A random walk technology shock can raise interest rates at all ho-
rizons, generating a “level” shock. Expected inflation might do so as well.
3. Implications for Monetary Policy
These last two observations suggest to me a way to start thinking about
the Atkeson‐Kehoe endogeneity hypothesis. If monetary policy does not
affect risk premiums, then we might expect monetary policy shocks to
give rise to a “slope” movement in the term structure—sending short
yields down (a “liquidity effect”) but long yields either up (“expected in-
flation effect”) or flat in an anchored‐expectations regime. (This is an-
other possible way to measure regime.)
Thus, we are beginning to see a united view:
• Slope movements in the term structure, monetary policy shocks, GDP
forecasts, and no change in risk premiums seem to go together.
Cochrane 442• High‐end curvature movements in the term structure, increasing risk
premiums in the term structure, the onset of recessions, and monetary
policy responses seem to go together.
In terms of modeling, monetary policy changes interest rates and the
slope of the term structure by changing the path of marginal utility growth:
Pð1Þ
t ¼ Et u′ðctþ1Þ=u′ðctÞ ½  ; P
ð2Þ
t ¼ Et u′ðctþ2Þ=u′ðctÞ ½  . If a monetary policy
shock generates no risk premium, it must not affect u′ðctÞ.(F u n d a m e n t a l l y ,
EðRtþ1   R
f
t Þ¼Cov Rtþ1; u′ðctþ1Þ ½    λ.) Thus, the Atkeson‐Kehoe view
says that monetary policy affects interest rates 1=P
ð1Þ
t and the slope of the
term structure (measures of P
ð2Þ
t   P
ð1Þ
t ) only by affecting future expected
marginal utility, with no effect on current marginal utility.
All of this is almost true, but not completely. First, most estimates,
such as those of Evans and Marshall (1998), do find that monetary pol-
icy shocks mostly have a substantial slope effect on the term structure.
Other estimates, Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) in particular, find that
there is a level effect as well—monetary policy shocks move short rates
more than long rates, but they move long rates as well, so they have
combined level and slope effects. (The main difference is that we find
longer‐lasting effects in policy movements that are not anticipated by
the bond markets, rather than just looking at the usual vector auto-
regression [VAR] shock identification.) If so, then expected returns are
in fact earned in part for exposure to monetary policy shocks. Second,
thoughariseinslopehasnoeffectoncurrentexpectedreturns,itdoesfore-
cast future expected returns. Both considerations suggest at least some
feedback. Third, of course all of these facts are preliminary and need a
lotofdigesting.Forexample,Angetal.’s(2006)measurementof“expected
interest rates” is a good deal different than the measurement in Cochrane
andPiazzesi(2008).And,fourth,allfactsarenotreallydigesteduntilthere
is some theory to understand them, which is a long way off.
D. Implications for Models
MuchofAtkesonandKehoe’spaperdiscussesthefailingsofmodelstopr o-
duce substantial risk premiums in response to monetary shocks. Although
thepaperisclear,thefollowingdiscussionseemednottorecognizethestark
choice. We either need new models that can generate risk premiums in re-
sponse to monetary policy shocks or we need to regard much variation in
interest rates as a response to risk premiums generated elsewhere, which is
prettymuchAtkesonandKehoe’sconclusion.Ifwechoosethelattercourse,
the only “n e wt h e o r yo fm o n e t a r yp o l i c y ” that we need is a new theory of
Comment 443the policy rule, an e wt h e o r yof the Fed, not a new theory of monetary policy
effects or a new theory of the economy. Similarly, the papergenerated much
needless heat over whether “theory” could explain the rise and fall of in-
flation. The standard theory of the economy does so quite well; Atkeson
and Kehoe could not find a theory of the Fed that did so, and their simply
labeling this absence a “lack of theory” generated confusion.
If we end up with Atkeson and Kehoe’s view, much of the standard
view of monetary policy shocks will remain. However, the often forgot-
ten fact that monetary policy shocks explain trivial fractions of output
variation and nonexistent fractions of inflation variation will remain.
We will see the Fed as essentially pretty helpless, forced to move inter-
est rates up and down in response to risk premiums. The main change
will be a different view of the rule, one that puts greater weight on risk
premia and less weight on output and inflation.
E. Summary
I have brought four risk premium facts and opined about their implica-
tions for the economics of monetary policy and for reading regimes
from bond data.
1. Unconditional risk premiums. Prewar data show a negative slope,
which is what we expect when price level uncertainty is removed from
long‐term bonds. I do not see an “anchoring” in the slope since 1990.
2. Conditional risk premiums—expected bond returns change over
time. Forward rates are not expected interest rates, with big differences
in the early stage of recessions. We see even less evidence for “anchor-
ing.” The Atkeson‐Kehoe hypothesis: perhaps the interest rate decline
is a response to risk premiums.
3. Output versus risk premium forecasts. Slope variables forecast out-
put growth; risk premium variables do not. Risk premium variables
forecast bond returns; slope variables do not.
4. Compensation for risk. Expected bond returns are earned entirely as
compensation for “level”—not monetary policy?—shocks.
IV. Agenda
Let me sum up with the main point of agreement:
• Risk premiums are important for the term structure and for under-
standing monetary policy.
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has essentially nothing to do with how you and I pay for coffee and
how often we go to the ATM machine. The Fed is affecting, regulating,
and acting through financial markets, which are inherently markets for
risk. Even calling it “monetary policy” seems an antiquated misnomer;
we should probably call it “financial policy.” How we will integrate Fed
policy and risk premiums—which causes which and why—remains to
be answered.
The main point of disagreement:
• I see no evidence in the term structure of interest rates that we have
moved to a substantially different “anchored expectations” regime and
certainly no evidence that we have moved to the equivalent of a “pre-
war” or gold standard regime with an anchored price level.
We are both guilty of basing these conclusions on graph‐staring
rather than quantitative theoretical and empirical evaluation of this is-
sue. Like many good conference papers, Atkeson and Kehoe’s raises
more questions than it answers; it gives a road map for interesting the-
oretical and empirical work to come. While that work remains to be
done, I am ready for stagflation: I am still buying TIPs, and I still have
my bell‐bottom jeans and wide‐lapel suit.
Endnotes
Updates and color versions of the figures (graphs) for this comment are available on
my Web site, http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/john.cochrane/research/Papers. I thank
Monika Piazzesi for helpful discussions.
1. I use the version of the 3‐month commercial paper rate from the NBER macro his-
tory Web site, which has fewer spikes than Atkeson and Kehoe’s data series.
2. Asmallsampling,takenfromaquicksearchofNBERworkingpapersincludesBuiter,
“Deflation: Prevention and Cure” (2003a) and “Helicopter Money: Irredeemable Fiat
Money and the Liquidity Trap” (2003b); Eggertsson and Woodford, “The Zero Bound on
Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy” (2003) and “Policy Options in a Liquidity
Trap” (2004); Svensson, ”Escaping from a Liquidity Trap and Deflation: The Foolproof
Way and Others (2003); Atkeson and Kehoe, “Deflation and Depression: Is There an Em-
pirical Link?” (2004); and Auerbach and Obstfeld, “Monetary and Fiscal Remedies for De-
flation” (2004). Good examples from the Fed include Ben Bernanke, “Deflation: Making
Sure ‘It’ Doesn’t Happen Here” (2002) and “An Unwelcome Fall in Inflation?” (2003).
The Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (2003) May 6 statement, e.g., echoed this
view:“TheFederalOpenMarketCommitteedecidedtokeepits targetforthefederalfunds
rate unchanged at 1‐1/4 percent. … The probability of an unwelcome substantial fall in
inflation, though minor, exceeds that of a pickup in inflation from its already low level.”
3. In February 2005, Chairman Alan Greenspan (2005b) said: “In the current episode,
however, the more‐distant forward rates declined at the same time that short‐term rates
were rising. Indeed, the tenth‐year tranche, which yielded 6‐1/2 percent last June, is now
at about 5‐1/4 percent. During the same period, comparable real forward rates derived
from quotes on Treasury inflation‐indexed debt fell significantly as well, suggesting that
only a portion of the decline in nominal forward rates in distant tranches is attributable to
Comment 445a drop in long‐term inflation expectations. … For the moment, the broadly unanticipated
behavior of world bond markets remains a conundrum.”
In June (Greenspan 2005a), he elaborated: “The pronounced decline in U.S. Treasury
long‐term interest rates over the past year despite a 200‐basis‐point increase in our federal
funds rate is clearly without recent precedent. The yield on ten‐year Treasury notes cur-
rently is at about 4 percent, 80 basis points less than its level of a year ago.” The remain-
der of the speech contained a list of “forces” that might be at work, including demands of
large players, including foreign governments. The latter are economically the same as
changes in risk premiums.
Governor Donald Kohn (2005) elaborated, including our “anchored” discussion:
“Nothing better illustrates the need to properly account for risk premiums than the cur-
rent interest rate environment: To what extent are long‐term interest rates low because
investors expect short‐term rates to be low in the future … and to what extent do low
long rates reflect narrow term premiums, perhaps induced by well‐anchored inflation
expectations or low macroeconomic volatility? Clearly, the policy implications of these
two alternative explanations are very different.”
Chairman Bernanke (2006) made clear how we separate yield curves into ‘expectation’
and ‘risk premium’ components and how stories about “demands” by various agents are
the same thing as a risk premium: “As I have noted, each of the forward interest rates im-
plicit in the term structure can be usefully decomposed into two parts: (1) the spot interest
rate that market participants currently expect to prevail at the corresponding date in the
future and (2) the additional compensation that investors require for the risk of holding
longer‐term instruments, known as the term premium. With the economic outlook held
constant, changes in the net demand for long‐term securities have their largest effect on
the term premium. In particular, if the demand for long‐dated securities rises relative to
the supply, then investors will generally accept less compensation to hold longer‐term
instruments—that is, the term premium will decline. According to several of the most pop-
ularmodels,asubstantialportionofthedeclineindistant‐horizonforwardratesoverrecent
quarters canbe attributed to a drop in term premiums. … The decline in the premium since
last June 2004 appears to have been associated mainly with a drop in the compensation for
bearing real interest rate risk.”
4. Chairman Bernanke (2006) seems to agree: “What does the historically unusual be-
havior of long‐term yields imply for the conduct of monetary policy? The answer, it turns
out, depends critically on the source of that behavior. To the extent that the decline in
forward rates can be traced to a decline in the term premium, perhaps for one or more
of the reasons I have just suggested, the effect is financially stimulative and argues for
greater monetary policy restraint, all else being equal. … However, if the behavior of
long‐term yields reflects current or prospective economic conditions, the implications
for policy may be quite different—indeed, quite the opposite. The simplest case in point
is when low or falling long‐term yields reflect investor expectations of future economic
weakness. Suppose, for example, that investors expect economic activity to slow at some
point in the future. If investors expect that weakness to require policy easing in the medium
term, they will mark down their projected path of future spot interest rates, lowering far‐
forward rates and causing the yield curve to flatten or even to invert.” I read the first part of
the statement as exactly the sort of response Atkeson and Kehoe argue for: if the risk pre-
mium declines, the Fed should raise interest rates (and vice versa).
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